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Jordan’s last population census gave the total population of the 
country as 9,531,712 in November 2015, 2,918,125 (31 per cent) of 
whom were foreign nationals. If accurate,1 these numbers indicate 
that Jordan is a major migrant-receiving country. Jordan has the 
highest refugee-to-population ratio and the country is also now the 
top refugee hosting country in absolute numbers. Indeed, it hosted 
more than 2.7 million registered refugees as of September 2016;2 of 
whom 2.1 million persons of Palestinian descent registered with the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East (UNRWA) who have lived in the country for decades; 
and 664,100 refugees under UNHCR’s mandate including Syrians 
and Iraqis.3 Besides, Jordan is a migrant-sending country too: an es-
timated 10 percent of Jordan’s nationals (700 to 800,000) are expatri-
ated abroad, most of them to the Gulf States. 
Jordan being historically a regional migration crossroads,4 its socio-
political history and geopolitical ambitions defined the country’s 
policy approach to migration movements. At first, an openness to 
Arab migrants sustained the pan-Arabist claims of the ruling Hashe-
mite dynasty, yet was coupled with a promotion of the right of return 
of refugees to their homeland. The first wave of refugees from Pal-
estine, forced to flee following the Israeli-Arab war and the creation 
of the State of Israel in 1948, trebled Jordan’s national population as 
Jordan naturalised all Palestinian refugees on both Banks, togeth-
er with the residents of the West Bank.5 However, Jordan’s official 
stance was always to defend Palestinians’ right of return, in line with 
UN resolution 194.6 In order to secure the implementation of the 
resolution, Palestinian refugees were excluded from the operational 
mandate of the International Organization for Refugees (IOR),7 and 
they were placed under the responsibility of a specific UN body, the 
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United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales-
tine Refugees in the Near East(UNRWA).8 Jordan’s 
official support for the refugees’ right of return also 
drove the regime to reject, the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention related to the status of refugees (or its 1967 
Protocol). The Six-Day War in 1967 and the occu-
pation of the West Bank by Israel pushed a second 
wave of refugees onto the East Bank, some original 
residents of the West Bank, not considered refugees 
but categorised as “displaced” within the borders of 
Jordan.9 Some 1948 naturalised refugees (registered 
with UNRWA) who had found shelter on the West 
Bank, along with some Palestinians from Gaza who 
did not hold Jordanian nationality,10 travelled to the 
East Bank, too. Later, the First Gulf War of 1990-
1991 forced a third wave of 350,000 “returnees” 
to Jordan: these were Jordanian nationals, most of 
whom were originally Palestinians naturalised after 
1948, who had emigrated to the Gulf States. It can 
be said that Palestinian refugees, the displaced and 
returnees played a decisive role in Jordan’s nation-
building process. Their incorporation into Jordan’s 
citizenry and polity gave the country a diplomatic 
role at the regional and international levels, as well as 
a demographic visibility. It also gave some political 
substance to the Hashemites’ pan-Arabist project.11
The emigration of Jordanian nationals to Arab oil 
producing countries, from the 1950s onwards and 
especially after 1973’s oil boom, also served the 
political interests of the regime, through its “open 
door” policies. Besides using emigrants as spear-
heads of Jordan’s influence beyond the country’s 
borders, emigration compensated for some citi-
zens’ (mostly, Palestinian refugees and displaced 
persons) eviction from the capital redistribution 
process, hence removing potential dissent from the 
country.12 Moreover, remittances received by the mi-
grants’ families played a determinant role in the de-
velopment of a consumption-based, non-productive 
economy and mode of wealth accumulation.13 The 
new private wealth spurred new demands in terms 
of services (domestic work for instance), while pub-
lic “rentier” income14 was channelled to infrastruc-
ture developments. As a result, work immigration 
to Jordan shot up in the 1970s, with, particularly, 
Egyptians and South East Asians arriving to work in 
the country. Low-skilled immigration enhanced the 
status of Jordanians through a job-ladder effect,15 
and foreign labour became an element in the clien-
telist redistribution of assets to citizens. Open-door 
migration policies, therefore, determined Jordan’s 
demographic, economic and political existence, and 
the country’s influence and resilience.16
Yet, two sets of factors pushed for a reform of migra-
tion policies: first, for labour migrants, and second 
for refugees. The collapse of Jordan’s rentier economy 
started in the mid-1980’s, and was compounded by 
the return of Jordanian expatriates from the Gulf.17 
This forced the country into a drastic reform pro-
cess of its economy. This was supported by a series of 
agreements with the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank which called for reform meas-
ures such as trade liberalisation, financial deregu-
lation and privatisation. Since the 2000s, educated 
Jordanians have returned to the Gulf in massive 
numbers, but keeping ties with expatriates is now 
high on the government’s agenda.18 However, the 
economy still struggles with low productivity and 
high unemployment rates.19 Yet, low-skilled activi-
ties are still looked down on by Jordanian workers: 
the cleaning and construction sectors for instance, 
as well as the manufacturing sector, one of the spear-
heads of economic-political reform.20 For these rea-
sons, business owners still favour foreign workers, 
who are also cheaper to employ. Immigrants are, 
therefore, seen as competing with local workers and 
the immigration of foreign labourers has become a 
political matter.
As far as refugees are concerned, the open-door 
policy and the assimilation of other Arabs into a 
Pan-Arabist Jordan ended formally in July 1988 with 
the severance of all administrative and legal ties be-
tween the West and the East Banks by King Hussein 
(in Arabic the fak irtibat). A million or more Jorda-
nian nationals residing on the West Bank lost their 
full Jordanian nationality, henceforth conditional on 
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residency in a shrunken Jordan, the East Bank. The 
PLO-Israel Oslo agreements in 1993 and the Wadi 
Araba Accords signed in 1994 between Jordan and 
Israel, moreover, de facto settled the 1948 refugees 
in host countries.21 Yet throughout the 2000s, the 
stalling peace processes deepened fears of a possi-
ble “transfer” of Palestinians to Jordan by Israel.22 
Among nationalists, the issue of the “Jordanian”/ 
“Jordanian-Palestinian” ratio became more burning 
than ever and several thousand Jordanian citizens 
were stripped of their nationality.23 Palestinians and 
Jordanians of Palestinian descent are now split be-
tween various legal-political categories and various 
levels of access to services.24
This set of factors radically changed the stakes and 
perceptions of openness to refugees (and workers) 
from the region. The new challenge of migration 
management for Jordan is to reconcile attracting 
foreign capital, keeping a political role in regional 
events and abiding by the demands of donors in 
terms of political-economic reform, while protect-
ing domestic stability and security. And this, in a 
context marked by growing inflation, pressure on 
scarce local resources and the housing market, as 
well as, most of all, by fears of an extension of re-
gional conflicts to the Kingdom. The Second Gulf 
War and the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 
Spring 2003, which brought to Jordan several hun-
dred thousand refugees from Iraq,25 raised all these 
challenges again. In a bid to silence the issue of pos-
sible long-term refugee settlements, Jordanian of-
ficials initially downplayed the Iraqis’ numbers and 
their humanitarian situation, calling them “guest” 
and not refugees. Later, while taken as a security is-
sue,26 Iraqis also became an economic opportunity: 
inflating their numbers allowed for more interna-
tional aid to be channelled into the country, aid that 
could be used in part for vulnerable Jordanian com-
munities.27
Since the advent of the war in Syria in March 2011 
Jordan has been receiving Syrian refugees within the 
framework of its Law of Residency and Foreigners’ 
Affairs.28 Those among them who seek asylum and 
access to UNHCR’s services in Jordan are automati-
cally recognized as prima facie refugees29 under the 
framework of a Jordan-UNHCR Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) signed in 1998.30 Yet, entries 
to Jordan were quickly restricted, first for the Pales-
tinian31 and Iraqi refugees from Syria as of 2012,32 
and later in 2013, for all Syrians. Mounting secu-
rity concerns explain these restrictions.33 To date, 
in September 2016, an estimated 70,000 Syrians are 
stranded in the desert no-man’s-land between Jor-
dan and Syria.34 Fewer than 20 percent of registered 
Syrian refugees reside in camps, but since mid-2014 
the movements of those settled in host communi-
ties have been increasingly restricted. UNHCR was 
instructed to stop delivering Asylum Seeker Cer-
tificates (ASCs) to refugees with no ‘bail out’ docu-
ments,35 pushing refugees, in a de facto manner, 
into camps for access to services.36 Police operations 
measures also drove more Syrian residents to camps, 
such as the verification campaign which started in 
February 2015, to biometrically register Syrian refu-
gees living in urban areas.37 Returns to Syria were re-
ported, some forcible.38 Some governmental services 
available to Syrian refugees living outside the camps 
were also cancelled late 2014, such as free access 
to healthcare centres. The government claimed the 
health sector was already overburdened and budgets 
stretched.39 For lack of funds, the World Food Pro-
gram (WFP) had also to drop one third of Syrian 
refugees from its food voucher program in Middle 
Eastern host countries, including 450,000 benefi-
ciaries among urban refugees in Jordan. These were 
only partly reinstated one year later.40 By mid-2015, 
86 percent of Syrians in urban areas were found to 
live below the Jordanian poverty line.41
The policies applied to Syrian refugees, more vulner-
able in general than most Iraqis received by Jordan 
in the 2000s,42 and the terms of the MoU signed with 
UNHCR all support Jordan’s stance that the refu-
gees’ stay in Jordan should be temporary.43 In spite 
of Syrians’ investments and wealth creation, prices 
went up and the competition of native labourers 
with Syrians, is an especially sensitive issue.44 Refu-
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gees’ right to work is, indeed, not mentioned in the 
MoU. However, Syrians can legally enter the labour 
market under conditions granted to other foreign-
ers: obtaining a work permit is conditional on resi-
dency, the sponsor/ employer has to pay permit fees 
and the profession has to be opened to non-Jordani-
ans. Some Syrians found (irregular) employment on 
low-paid jobs in the informal economy, as few man-
aged to pay labour permit fees and refugees do not 
have residency documents. Moreover, those living 
in refugee camps are not entitled to work permits: 
this includes those who entered Jordan through un-
official border crossings. Syrian employment quo-
tas also apply.45 Within the global framework of the 
Jordan-EU Mobility Partnership,46 and amid a deep-
ening EU migration crisis, the Syria donors confer-
ence held in London 4 February 2016 had Jordan 
commit to integrate 200,000 Syrian refugees into its 
labour force within five years, especially in the coun-
try’s Special Economic Zones.47 In return, the EU, 
the World Bank and other donors promised Jordan 
two billion US$ or more aid packages (“compacts”), 
grants and cheap loans, as well as improved access 
to European trade markets for Jordanian products. 
The aim of the compact was to “transform the Syrian 
refugee crisis into an opportunity for development”: 
priorities outlined in the resilience component of 
the plan target host communities.48
The move was hailed as a step towards refugees’ self-
reliance, as even Syrians without documents can ap-
ply for labour permits.49 A grace period for waiving 
penalties and new visa fees was extended to October 
2016, during which there would be no deportation 
of illegal workers to camps. It is expected that irreg-
ular workers would legalise their situation and that 
unofficial Syrian businesses could be formally reg-
istered. In return, Jordan hopes that securing wages 
for Syrians would increase consumer spending, and 
drive up all wages.50 However, non-Syrian foreign 
labourers will be affected by the measure, which 
spurred protests by employers.51 Moreover, Syrians 
face many obstacles in accessing legal employment, 
including the limited range of professions avail-
able to non-Jordanians and the sponsorship issue.52 
Amid political tensions,53 the delivery of aid and 
loans, which is conditioned on Jordan’s performance 
in meeting its employment goals, has been slow to 
follow through since the London Conference.
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OUTWARD MIGRATION
Stock
In 2014, an estimated 785,000 Jordanian migrants (first-
generation, born in Jordan) were residing abroad, that is 
10.5 percent of the country’s total national population. 
The vast majority of Jordanian expatriates were in Arab 
countries (84 percent), including Palestine.54  However, 
the main destination for Jordanian migrants are the 
Gulf States, and especially Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). The two countries together host 
an estimated 450,000 Jordanians, or 68 percent of all 
Jordanian migrants. 55
INWARD MIGRATION
Stock
In November 2015, Jordan’s sixth population census 
counted around 2.9 million foreign residents, 30.6 
percent of the total population of 9.5 million. This 
was an astonishing increase from the 392,273 non-
Jordanians recorded eleven years earlier during the 2004 
census: a seven-and-half-fold increase and a growth of 
153 percent. 
The only census results disclosed to date (September 
2016) on the nationality breakdown of the non-
national residents highlight the role of regional political 
instability in the makeup of migrant communities in 
Jordan. Besides Egyptians, who remain the second 
nationality group and are considered labour migrants, 
the numbers of nationals from Arab countries at war 
shot up: a three- to a thirty-three-fold increase between 
2004 and 2015, according to nationality. 
The numbers recorded in 2004 may have been 
underestimated, especially that of Egyptians who 
are often in an irregular situation. The increase in 
the numbers of Iraqis between the two dates may be 
explained by the long-term settlement of refugees from 
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Jordanian expatriates in the Gulf usually have a balanced 
sex ratio: 109 males for 100 females in Kuwait in 
December 2012, for instance.56 Of the 55,081 Jordanians 
residing in Kuwait that year, 37 percent were workers and 
63 percent were family dependents. The high proportion 
of family dependents among Jordanian expatriates there 
indicates that they are mostly highly-skilled: the level of 
income and skills, indeed, determines the right to family 
reunion in Gulf countries.57 These nationals occupy 
professions in the upper income bracket, which offer the 
best possibilities for family reunion.58  The last scientific 
survey on Jordanians employed abroad, conducted in 
the 1980s, emphasized that 32% held a university degree 
(7,3% in the non-migrant population), while 36% 
were employed as technicians.59  Jordanians working 
in the Gulf States, among whom a small but growing 
proportion of females,60  are employed in many sectors: 
in the Defence and intelligence services, in engineering 
and construction, media and IT, in education, higher 
education and health sectors, tourism and hotel services, 
in finance as well as in the management and business 
sectors.61 
Non-Arab countries host much smaller numbers of 
Jordanian migrants: around 75,000 in the US and 
Canada; and 31,000 in Europe (c. 2015). Most of them 
are male (58 percent) and 85 percent are in working age 
groups (aged 15- 64).
the second Gulf War and especially, its most violent 
phase in 2006-2007; the current situation in Iraq may 
have deterred many from returning. The growth of the 
number of Palestinians69 (from 115,000 to 634,000) 
may also be explained by the continuous degradation 
of the political and economic situation in the Palestine 
National Authority (PNA). The very high figure of 1.3 
million Syrians in Jordan, however, raises questions. 
Syrians registered as refugees by UNHCR in November 
2015, at the time of the census, numbered 633,644. This 
would mean that 631,870 Syrians were residing in Jordan 
as non-refugee migrants at that date: 1,265,514 Syrians 
counted in census - 633,644 recorded refugees that same 
month. This figure seems in tune with the estimates of 
500,000 to 700,000 Syrians residing in Jordan at the 
beginning of the conflict, released unofficially by the 
Jordanian Ministry of Interior in 2011.70 Some factors 
may, indeed, support the increase of the non-refugee 
Syrian population in Jordan, from the 38,130 recorded 
in 2004: 1- Some Syrian families who were living in 
Lebanon, as well as Syrian business owners relocated 
to Jordan after Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 
late April 2005, and during the following years.71 Since 
these arrived after 2004 census, their numbers are 
unknown; 2- Syrian seasonal workers included many in 
the north of Jordan, who used to commute from Syria 
without proper work permits. These may have crossed 
over with their families when the conflict began; 3-In 
the run-up to a conflict, the first wave of migrants to 
the nearest countries usually concerned the ones with 
capital, be it financial (assets or possibility of income in 
the host country) or social (business, family72 or ethnic 
networks, for instance). The wealthy among these early 
migrants may not have needed, or sought registration in 
order to access basic services.73 
That said, many in Jordan denied that a reliable door-
to-door counting of all residents, including Syrians, 
was conducted during the November 2015 census.74 
Besides, counts performed by concerned ministerial 
bodies and other agencies 1- select counted populations 
in line with the agency’s focus; and 2- support inter-
agency competition for resources and influence. Figures 
of non-refugee Syrians in Jordan could be inflated, for 
economic and political purposes as during other refugee 
waves, yet to an unknown extent.75 
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However, these aggregated figures cover a very diverse 
demographic and socio-economic profile by country of 
destination, as emphasized in Figure 1. All displaying 
a balanced sex ratio, Sweden and Canada host families 
with children: around 20 percent of Jordanian migrants 
there are below 15 years of age. In the US, meanwhile, the 
age distribution of Jordanian migrants rather suggests 
the presence of families and middle-aged professionals. 
By contrast, 56 percent of the Jordanian nationals 
residing in the UK in 2015 held education-related 
residency permits,62  which is consistent with the age 
group most represented there (25-34 years). Germany 
hosts a majority of men (77 percent), most of them aged 
25 to 44 years, as well as above 65. This rather skewed 
age and sex distribution may be partly explained by the 
specificity of the Jordanian population in Germany: as 
of December 2015, 26 percent of Jordanian residents 
there held a permit for humanitarian purposes, while 
half were there under family reunion schemes.63  Those 
in refugee-like situations and family members also 
made up a sizeable share of Jordanians in Sweden: 
respectively, 16 and 73 percent of permit-holders. 
In Jordan, as elsewhere, migration is a selective process: 
migrants are twice as educated as non-migrants (Fig. 
2). In general, Jordanian migrants are highly-educated 
(56 percent of those aged 25 to 34 for instance). Yet, 
the receiving countries’ policies and socio-economic 
Syrians make up the vast majority of refugees registered 
by UNHCR in Jordan (91 percent). It is interesting to 
note, too, that figures of Iraqi and Yemeni registered 
refugees are markedly lower than the total figures of 
these nationalities recorded in the census. This confirms 
the presence in Jordan of wealthy and/or unregistered 
nationals from countries at war in the region.
 
As of mid-September 2016, most Syrian refugees were 
registered in the governorates of Amman (27 percent) 
and Irbid (21 percent). Camps dwellers made up 22 
percent of all registered Syrian refugees with Za’atari 
camp housing 79,884 persons. Syrian refugees displayed 
a balanced sex ratio and were mostly young (52 percent 
were aged 0-17). The 4,758 unaccompanied children 
recorded made up less than 1 percent of all registered 
Syrians. Most refugees came from Dera’a (42 percent of 
the total).
Besides UNHCR-registered refugees, as of December 
2015, 2,117,361 refugees from Palestine were registered 
by UNRWA in Jordan. Of these, most have full 
citizenship76  and only a small share of these refugees 
should be considered as migrants.77 There are three 
unofficial and ten recognized Palestine refugee camps in 
Jordan. The latter accommodate nearly 370,000 Palestine 
refugees (18 percent of all registered Palestinian refugees 
in Jordan).78  According to a survey conducted in 2013, 
non-citizen Palestinian refugees were most often Gaza 
Palestinians or their descendants, who held two-year 
temporary passports.79  As non-nationals, they are more 
vulnerable and at risk of poverty. 
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setup also strongly select migrants. The UK’s and 
Canada’s points-based immigration system mostly 
channel highly-educated, post-graduate students and 
young highly-skilled professionals to these countries. In 
Sweden and Germany, meanwhile, there are more less 
educated family members and male refugees. 
Flows
The propensity to migrate is high in Jordan: 37 percent 
of the country’s youth aged 15 to 29 expressed their 
desire to emigrate in 2010.64  Migration flows have been 
subject to great variations over the last decades, due to 
political events as well as to economic fluctuations in 
the region. Following the 1973 oil-boom, emigration 
from Jordan to the Gulf oil-producing countries surged. 
However, the progressive replacement of Arab by Asian 
workers after 1979 led to the gradual return of Jordanian 
migrants from the Gulf countries during the 1980s. As 
illustrated in Figure 3, the 1990-1991 Gulf War forced a 
further 300,000 expatriates back to Jordan. 
After a brief upsurge in returns following the signing of 
the peace process between Jordan and Israel in 1994, net 
migration has nevertheless remained steadily negative 
since 1995. The increase in oil prices in the early 2000s 
Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) number around 
17,000 in Jordan,80  where they live with a precarious 
legal status and under threat of deportation. The same 
survey estimated that 68 percent of Palestinians living 
outside camps, and 86 percent of Palestinians living 
inside camps were registered with UNRWA as refugees. 
Non-registered Palestinians may then be persons 
categorised as “displaced” (i.e., displaced for the first 
time from the West Bank after 1967), or de-facto 1948 
refugees who either failed to register with UNRWA, 
lost their registration, or did not wish to use UNRWA 
services.81 
As of 2014, foreign nationals holding a valid labour 
permit stood at 324,410, of whom 78 percent were 
males. Most were poorly educated: 95 percent were 
recorded with below secondary level of education. The 
vast majority were Egyptian nationals: 65 percent of all 
foreign workers and 83 percent of all males among them. 
Bangladeshis, meanwhile, made up 13 percent of all 
permit holders and 48 percent of females among them, 
followed by Filipinas and Sri Lankans (respectively 21 
and 15 percent of legal female workers). 
 
Figure 7 indicates the selectivity of employment by sex 
and nationality in Jordan: Egyptians (and other male 
Arab workers) are mostly employed in agriculture 
and construction, while females, mostly Asians from 
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led to considerable investment in all sorts of projects 
in the Gulf region, and increased the need for highly-
skilled workers in numerous sectors, hence the new 
record-high net outflow in 2003. However, the 2008 
financial crisis and the ensuing economic slowdown 
in many GCC states (UAE especially) tempered the 
net outflows. Figure 3 also suggests an acceleration of 
mobility of Jordanians since the mid-2000s, illustrated 
in the hike in the number of movements recorded at 
the borders (departures and arrivals) after 2006 (black 
and dotted lines). Direct observation suggests that 
Jordanian professionals and investors increasingly took 
up activities in several locations, or started keeping 
businesses running abroad, while at the same time 
creating start-ups in Jordan.65 
As a matter of fact, Jordanians’ entries to and exits 
from Saudi Arabia (Figure 4), the major destination for 
Jordanian migrants, went up steadily over the decade, 
but net flows have been decreasing since 2006. They 
have even been negative (more Jordanians leaving than 
entering Saudi Arabia) in 2013. As they are mostly skilled 
and highly-skilled, it is unlikely that Jordanians left as a 
result of the massive crackdown campaigns conducted 
that year by the Saudi authorities against foreigners 
in an irregular situation. However, it is possible that 
Jordanians there, have first, repatriated their families, 
and also explored new business opportunities in more 
the three selected countries, dominated household 
domestic work. Sri Lankan and Bangladeshi women 
are also many in manufacturing (apparel and garment) 
industries. These are often located within Qualifying 
Industrial Zones (QIZs) where workers are housed in 
compounds.
However, irregular labour prevails in Jordan: recent 
governmental estimates suggested that foreign labourers 
numbered around 800,000 as of mid-2016, including 
about 300,000 holders of regular working permits. Of 
the guest workers employed in the agricultural sector, 
for instance, only 40 per cent were said to have permits 
and of these, 70 per cent had purportedly moved to 
work illegally in other sectors.82 As for Syrians, who 
were granted only 5,700 work permits in 2014, estimates 
of informal workers range between 42,000 and 150,000 
(World Bank)83, and 160,000 to 200,000 (Jordan’s 
Ministry of Labour, 2015).84  Syrians allegedly working 
without permits were said to be in the construction, 
retail and wholesale stores, restaurants, services and 
agriculture sectors.
Flows
 
The outflow of Syrian refugees to Jordan started 
immediately after March 2011. Refugees intended 
to stay close to their original locations in order to 
commute or return easily. Cross-border networks 
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politically-stable environments like Western countries. 
These changes are the cumulative effect of the political 
tensions since the Arab uprisings, the economic 
uncertainties ongoing since the 2008 financial crisis 
and the contractions in public expenditure and in 
subcontracting (in construction, infrastructural projects 
especially), coupled with the constraints in employment 
posed by the numerous labour reforms (the new policies 
of Saudisation of the workforce especially).
 
It appears that, since 2003, more Jordanians took up 
residency in the US, host to the largest community of 
Jordanian migrants outside the Gulf (Fig. 5). Permits 
granted increased, from 2,927 in 2003 to a high of 5,187 
in 2014 and the total stocks of Jordanian migrants grew 
by 72 percent during the period.66 The movement of 
naturalisations is relatively well correlated to that of 
permits (r=0.67 until 2013), which perhaps indicates 
“strategic transnationalism”67 (securing a Western 
nationality to guarantee mobility in a context of the 
increasing “securitization” of migration).  
Meanwhile, the flow of remittances sent back by 
expatriates continued rising, after a brief stalling in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis in the late 2000s 
(Figure 6). This confirms the sustainability of migration 
flows from Jordan. Remittances constituted about 10 
percent of the country’s GDP in 2015, down from about 
23 percent in 2001-2002.68  Against the backdrop of 
increasing remittances, this drop in their relative share 
(family, intermarriage, seasonal employment, business) 
also initially provided short-term accommodation and 
assistance. Figure 8 indicates that new registrations 
peaked during the first half of 2013 and reached 
about 300,000 for that whole year. Since late 2013, the 
progressive closing of Jordan’s borders has kept total 
numbers of refugees almost at standstill with 33,291 
new arrivals in 2015 and about 36,000 for the first nine 
months of 2016.85  Some returns to Syria were reported, 
mostly by families having exhausted all their resources 
and support mechanisms in Jordan and deportations to 
Syria also occurred.86  As of early 2016, Syrian refugees’ 
rate of resettlement to a third country from Jordan was 
very low (2.3 percent).87 
The flows of foreign workers have also changed over 
recent years. Egyptians continued to dominate the 
labour market, but a diversification of Asian nationalities 
can be noticed. Filipina and Sri Lankans, mostly female 
domestic labourers were briefly outnumbered by 
Indonesians in the late 2000s, before a ban stopped the 
latter’s employment. Also, the increase in the numbers 
of Bangladeshis points to the development of the 
manufacturing industrial sector in Jordan.
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of the GDP is due to the increase in Jordan’s GDP over 
the same period. Notwithstanding their nature as private 
assets, expatriates’ remittances still play a major role in 
supporting households’ income and Jordan’s economy.  
The total number of work permits delivered stalled 
between 2007 and 2011. This was partly a result of the 
economic slowdown of the late 2000s and partly due to 
the toughening of labour force nationalisation schemes 
(Jordanisation). This was, then, coupled with attempts 
at better controlling irregular labour. Yet, since the 
beginning of the Syrian war, the number of permits 
granted are on the rise again. This suggests that new 
foreign investments and an increase in consumption 
due to population increases stimulated employment in 
Jordan, including foreign employment. 
Figures from Jordan’s Ministry of Labour indicate 
that the total number of valid work permits issued to 
Syrians as of August 2016, had reached above 26,000 
and was on the rise, in line with Jordan’s commitments 
to international donors. Syrians then made up 11% of 
the total migrant officially registered labour force. This 
was up from a modest 1.8 percent in 2014. Syrians who 
are mostly low-skilled, will surely compete with most 
other foreign nationalities, Arab (Egyptians) and Asian, 
for jobs in industry, construction, trade and hospitality, 
as well as in agriculture. 
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 Footnote
1 These numbers will be discussed in the following sec-
tion (Inward migration-stocks).
2 As recently emphasised by Amnesty International in 
a report on the global refugee crisis https://www.am-
nesty.org/en/documents/pol40/4905/2016/en/
3 We use the term “migrant” to designate persons born 
outside Jordan, who may (or may not) currently hold 
Jordanian nationality. 
4 Historically a crossroad of trade, pilgrimage and no-
madic circulation routes and seasonal migration, the 
Emirate of Transjordan was established in 1921 after 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Its population of 
Bedouin, sometimes nomadic populations, Arab and 
Caucasian (Tcherkess) villagers later aggregated with 
traders, artisans, soldiers and bureaucrats from the 
Hedjaz, Syria and Palestine, called upon by Abdallah 
I, an Arab nationalist, to lay the basis of the State ap-
paratus.
5 The East Bank of Jordan alone received between 
70,000 and 100,000 persons and 280,000 to 400,000 
went to the West Bank, whose territory was annexed 
by Jordan in 1949 in a bid to expand its territory and 
influence. 
6  UNGA resolution 194 (III), voted 11 December 1948.
7  Palestinian refugees were rejected by the International 
Organization for Refugees (IOR, the body preceding 
UNHCR) in 1948, for according to the UN organiza-
tion, Palestinians could not convincingly demonstrate 
their forced expulsion. Additionally, OIR and its suc-
cessor UNHCR, was geared towards reinstalling refu-
gees in third countries, which contravened refugees’ 
unconditional rights to return to their homelands in 
Arab countries’ views (see Doraï, K; and Al-Husseini, 
J. “Palestine”, in: Simon, G. (ed.). Dictionnaire géo-his-
torique des migrations internationales, Paris: Armand 
Colin, 2015, pp. 284-289 (p. 286)). 
 8  UNGA Resolution 302(IV) of 8 December 1949. Pal-
estinian refugees were defined as those: (1) whose 
normal place of residence was Palestine from 1 June 
1946 to 15 May 1948; (2) who lost both home and 
means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflicts; (3) 
who found refuge in a country where UNRWA pro-
vides assistance; or (4) who is a descendant through 
the male line of someone meeting conditions (1) to 
(3). UNRWA’s operation zone was circumscribed to 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip.
 9 They were considered “displaced” within the borders 
of Jordan, because of Jordan’s annexation of the West 
Bank between 1949 and 1967, and therefore, did not 
qualify for registration as UNRWA’s beneficiaries. 
UNGA Resolution 2252 (ES-V), 4 July 1967 defines 
the displaced Palestinians as those “unable to return to 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967”. 
The East Bank received 240,000 to 330,000 1948 refu-
gees and displaced persons.
10 Between 1948 and 1967, the Gaza Strip was adminis-
tered by Egypt. The 1948 refugees who settled in Gaza 
were registered with UNRWA and all the resident 
population there was granted Egyptian travel docu-
ments. 
11 Jordanians of Palestinian descent are indeed a part 
of the networks of economic patronage and political 
clientelism which have structured Jordanian society. 
Besides their role in the setting up of Jordan’s State ap-
paratus since 1921 (see footnote 4), some Palestinian 
families have been long-term allies of the Hashemites, 
and have occupied high-ranking political functions 
since 1921, including in the Army and intelligence 
services. The decision, taken by Arab representatives 
in the 1974 Rabat Conference, to grant the PLO sole 
representation of Palestinians (claimed by Jordan) 
spurred the perception, for many on the East Bank, 
that Palestinians were ultimately a menace to Jordan’s 
sovereignty and security, henceforth limiting oppor-
tunities of Jordanian-Palestinians within the State 
apparatus. On Jordan’s political demography and 
nation-building process, see: De Bel-Air, F. “Migra-
tion, Security and the Palestinian Question. Palestin-
ian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Granting Rights, 
or Pushing for Resettlement?”, CARIM Research Re-
port 2012/02, San Domenico Di Fiesole (Florence, 
Italy): Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
(RSCAS), European University Institute (EUI), 2012. 
http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=484&c
allText=1737).    
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12 Those evicted from the patronage and clientelism net-
works (see footnote 11). 
13 External revenues not generated by productive activi-
ties amounted to 50 percent of Jordan’s GDP c. 1980. 
They were private funds, the remittances sent by some 
300,000 Jordanian workers expatriated in the Gulf 
(approximately one third of its labour force), as well 
as public funds, the important amounts of aid granted 
by oil-producing countries to Jordan. 
14 Arab developmental aid to Jordan, encouraged by the 
steady flows of skilled and highly-skilled Jordanian 
workers to the Gulf, reached as high as 25 percent of 
Jordan’s GDP in the mid-1980s.This made Jordan a 
“rentier economy” (Brand, L. Jordan’s Inter-Arab Rela-
tions: The Political Economy of Alliance Making, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
15 Refers to the upscale mobility of non-expatriate labour 
force, even though its education and qualification lev-
els remain low, because the influx of the rent into the 
economy raised its ambitions, in terms of wages as 
well as in terms of status.
16 De Bel-Air, F. « Migrations internationales et politique 
en Jordanie », Revue européenne des Migrations inter-
nationales, 2003 (19), pp. 9-41.
17 After a decrease in oil prices, Arab aid started declin-
ing, while Arab workers were to be gradually replaced 
by Asians in the Gulf countries in the early 1980s. 
Their progressive return to the country dried out re-
mittances. Jordan resorted to borrowing to keep up 
the strong public sector and the newly acquired stand-
ard of living and consumerist habits of its population, 
until it had no choice but to open negotiations with 
the IMF, to reschedule its debt.
18 Essentially to attract more investments and transfers. 
Expatriates’ conferences under royal patronage and 
involving high-ranking political and economic actors 
have been held since the 1990s, the last one in Sum-
mer 2015. 
19 Estimated at about 15 percent mid-2016 (http://dos.
gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/archive/Unemp/2016/
Emp_2016-q2.pdf ).
20 Mainly in the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs), 
special economic zones set up in Jordan in the after-
math of the peace process with Israel. It introduced 
export-led, labour intensive industrial plants, mainly 
in the sector of textile and garment. QIZs offer duty- 
and quota-free access to the US and EU markets for 
products manufactured by “qualifying” enterprises lo-
cated in those enclaves, which must meet certain cri-
teria regarding foreign participation to qualify under 
the program.
21 By recognizing the State of Israel in Oslo and Wadi 
Araba Agreements, Palestinian authorities and Jordan 
implicitly acknowledged as impossible a return of the 
1948 refugees to territories belonging to Israel. 
22 The failure of the Oslo agreements postpones the crea-
tion of a Palestinian State. As Israel keeps control of 
occupied lands in the West Bank, the Palestinians 
hold a political but not a territorial identity. The ques-
tion of the political representation of the diaspora’s 
members, in Palestinian institutions as well as in the 
host countries (they are full citizens in Jordan since 
1950) is thus raised, along with fears of double alle-
giance.
 Moreover, if initial supporters of the peace agreements 
stated that recognition of Israel by Jordan would work 
both ways and so secure Jordan’s sovereign borders 
and political existence, its failure reignites fears that 
Jordan may become the alternative homeland to Pal-
estinians (Abu Odeh, A. Jordanians, Palestinians, and 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Middle East 
Peace Process, Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1999, p.234; De Bel-Air, 2012 (op.cit.), 
pp. 38-39). 
 The concept of “transfer”, or “the organised removal 
of the indigenous populations of Palestine to neigh-
bouring countries” has been an essential part of Zion-
ist political thought since T. Herzl. See Masalha, N. 
Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of ‘Transfer’ 
in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948, Washington: 
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992.
23 Originally from the West Bank, these citizens were 
said not to have been living on the East Bank at the 
time of the 1988 fak irtibat (Human Rights Watch. 
Stateless Again. Palestinian-Origin Jordanians De-
prived of their Nationality, February 2010). In 2009, 
public protests were held over such reports, while na-
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gees’ right of return and Anti-Zionism (on this and 
the “political naturalisations” debate, see De Bel-Air, 
2012 (op.cit.), pp. 47-51).
24 http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/
expert-guides/palestinian-refugees-in-jordan/pales-
tinian-refugees-in-jordan. 
25 After refugees fleeing Saddam Hussein’s repression 
against the Shiites and other opponents during the 
1990s, the 2003 war and its aftermath brought new 
waves of Iraqis to Jordan: former allies of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime and after 2006-2007, families flee-
ing the civil war, sectarian conflicts and clashes with 
the American troops. UNHCR and the Jordanian 
government estimated their numbers to have reached 
750,000 in the mid-2000s, a figure later contested and 
estimated as being closer to 160,000 as of 2007 (Fafo/
Jordan Department of Statistics. Iraqis in Jordan 2007: 
Their Number and Characteristics, November 2007).  
26 Until November 2005 and a terrorist attack on inter-
national hotels in Amman, Iraqis could enter Jordan 
freely. After the attacks in 2006, the entries of adult 
males and other categories (Shiites for instance) were 
restricted, while residency conditions were tightened. 
Entry visas were imposed in late 2007 and Iraqis have 
to hold residency documents (De Bel-Air, F. “Iraqis 
in Jordan since 2003: What Socio-Political Stakes?”, in 
: Iraqi Refugees in the Host Countries of the Middle 
East, CARIM-RR 2009/10, Euro-Mediterranean Con-
sortium for Applied Research on International Migra-
tion (CARIM), San Domenico di Fiesole (Florence, 
Italy): Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies 
(RSCAS), European University Institute, 2009 http://
hdl.handle.net/1814/11255 and De Bel-Air, F. “State 
Policies on Migration and Refugees in Jordan”, Forced 
Migration and Refugee Studies Program, American 
University in Cairo AUC, 2008, http://www.aucegypt.
edu/ResearchatAUC/rc/cmrs/reports/Documents/
Francoise%20de%20Belair.pdf ).  
27 See for instance Chatelard, G. et al. Protection, mo-
bility and livelihood challenges of displaced Iraqis in 
urban settings in Jordan, International Catholic Mi-
gration Commission, May 2009, http://reliefweb.int/
sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/751268C72BA0BC
D0492575EE0018E0D8-Full_Report.pdf; Seeley, N. 
“The Politics of Aid to Iraqi Refugees in Jordan”, Mid-
dle East Report 256, https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&
rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=18&cad=rja&u
act=8&ved=0ahUKEwjuhbLb3dDPAhXCDsAKHay
5BbM4ChAWCE0wBw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.
merip.org%2Fmer%2Fmer256%2Fpolitics-aid-iraqi-
refugees-jordan&usg=AFQjCNHKtEvhdTuXoYtCn
WVhkkKAf6Nhbw ; De Bel-Air, 2009, op. cit.
28 Syrians are allowed to enter Jordan with their pass-
port only. Visa and residency permit are not re-
quired (Achilli, L.“Syrian Refugees in Jordan:a Reality 
Check”, MPC Policy Brief 2015/02, San Domenico di 
Fiesole: Migration Policy Centre, EUI-RSCAS, Feb-
ruary 2015, p. 3). Syrians need to register with UN-
HCR and the Jordanian Ministry of Interior only if 
they want to access assistance and services available 
to asylum seekers (Chatelard, G. “Iraqi and Syrian 
Refugees in Jordan Adjusting to Displacement: Com-
paring their Expectations towards UNHCR and their 
Capacities to use their Educational Assets”, in Dionigi, 
F. et. al. The Long Term Challenges of Forced Migration. 
Perspectives from Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, London: 
LSE Middle East Centre Collected Papers, n° 6, Sep-
tember 2016, pp. 22-25 (p. 23)).
29 Syrians are not required to undergo a refugee status 
determination process and are thus afforded protec-
tion and access to subsidized primary health care and 
other essential services.
30 The Jordan-UNHCR MoU was partially amended in 
March 2014 to give UNHCR 90 days to examine ap-
plications submitted by refugees who enter Jordan.
31 Al Husseini, J. and Doraï, K. “La vulnérabilité des ré-
fugiés palestiniens à la lumière de la crise syrienne”, 
Confluences Méditerranée, 87 – Automne 2013, pp.95-
107.
32 Amnesty International. Growing Restrictions, Tough 
Conditions: The Plight of Those Fleeing Syria to Jordan, 
2013, p. 10 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
MDE16/003/2013/en/
33  Due to Jordan’s participation in the anti-terrorism co-
alition and since September 2014, in the military cam-
paign against the Islamic State and Jabhat Al-Nusra in 
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since 2012, attempts at the infiltration of activists, as 
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ber 2016. http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/201
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39 Francis, A. Jordan’s Refugee Crisis, Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, September 2015, p. 24 
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versity School of Law, 2015, http://www.bu.edu/law/
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there during the period held Jordanian nationality, 
and may have reported themselves as being born in 
Jordan. Yet, they did not physically migrate; 2- Some 
Palestinians may be born in Jordan (East Bank), with-
out holding Jordanian nationality: for example, the 
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ber of Jordan (East Bank)-born Jordanian nationals, 
holding PA documents or not, residing in Palestine at 
the time of census, stands somewhere between 50, 350 
and 431, which is the number of residents recorded 
as Jordanian nationals during census 2007 in Pales-
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p?callContent=484&callText=1550
 However, only 17.5 percent of Jordanian females in 
Kuwait were registered as workers in 2013.
61 De Bel-Air, F. “Jordan, a land of no return? Highly-
skilled migration, before and after the Arab Spring”, 
in: Fargues, Ph. / Venturini, A. (Eds.). Migration from 
North Africa and the Middle-East: Skilled Migrants, 
Development and Globalization, London: I.B. Tauris, 
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live on both sides of the border), as well as by cross-
border seasonal work from Syria to Jordan. 
73 Refugee waves are increasingly deprived, hence in dire 
need for protection as refugee. This is supported by 
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